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Dark Places : Ecology, Place, and the
Metaphysics of Horror Fiction
Brad Tabas
The world is increasingly unthinkable—a world of
planetary disasters, emerging pandemics,
tectonic shifts, strange weather, oil-drenched
seascapes, and the furtive, always-looming threat
of extinction. In spite of our daily concerns,
wants, and desires, it is increasingly difficult to
comprehend the world in which we live and of
which we are a part. To confront this idea is to
confront an absolute limit to our ability to
adequately understand the world at all—an idea
that has been a central motif of the horror genre
for some time. (Thacker 1)
1 Horror fictions are very much about ambiance, place, surroundings and environment.
While  lesser  examples  of  the  genre  use  stock  scenarios  like  haunted houses,  misty
graveyards, and god-forsaken rock outcroppings, most of the finest pieces of horror
writing explore the expression of place in highly specific and deeply innovative ways.
Sometimes this engagement with place, as in the work of China Miéville, involves the
invention of new and weird topographies, while for other writers, the places described
are known regions and even seemingly familiar locales. For H.P. Lovecraft, it was the
New England landscape, with its “vast and gloomy virgin forests in whose perpetual
twilight all terrors might well lurk” (Lovecraft 1973, 60-61) that gave birth to Edgar
Allen  Poe  and  Nathaniel  Hawthorne  (and  surely  also  to  Lovecraft  himself.)  Jeff
VanderMeer, one of the contemporary writers that I turn to at a later juncture, openly
admits the importance of the Quinta da Regaleira in Sintra, Portugal as well as the Saint
Mark’s wildlife refuge in Florida as sources of inspiration. Nor is the expression of place
in weird fiction restricted to a banal or artless preoccupation with describing places or
alluding  to  hackneyed topoi  (as  the  Gothic  is  sometimes  accused  of  doing  with  its
haunted castles and misty moors). Indeed, the most strikingly original aspect of the
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best weird fiction’s expression of place is the ways in which it deforms or veers (in
Nicolas Royle’s finely nuanced sense of the term) our ordinary and often careless ways
of talking about the environment into novel and arresting literary expressions.
2 Strangely enough, though, ecologically engaged critics have barely cast an eye towards
this  kind  of  writing.  Lynch,  Glotfelty,  and  Armbruster’s  recent  The  Bioregional
Imagination :  Literature,  Ecology,  and  Place,  devotes  no  chapter  to  horror  writing  and
many to  nature  writing  and regional  literature.  The  same is  true  of  Friedman and
Waldron’s Towards a Literary Ecology : Places and Spaces in American Literature. Surely the
excuse for this oversight would somehow involve the notion of the natural and some
form of  insistence  that  horror  does  not  deal  with  the  natural  but  rather  with  the
supernatural, as it is of nature and naturalism that the editors of these volumes speak
when they explain the general literary strategies at work in the texts covered in their
volumes.  But  as  we will  see,  this  overlooks  and misunderstands  the  functioning of
explorations  of  place  in  horror.  Another  possible  justification  for  ignoring  horror
might involve the claim that all horror is set in generic locations, or perhaps it might
suggest that it is preoccupied with ghosts and figments of the imagination as opposed
to the depths of cosmic reality. But both of these objections, as we shall see, are quite
shallow, quickly remedied and responded to via the reading of the highest examples of
weird  writing.  Doubtless  this  disregard  for  the  weird  tradition  also  results  from  a
somewhat blinkered conception of ecological criticism, one perhaps tied too closely to
the idea of seeing literature as a means of transmitting information, and too married to
the idea that evocations of place in literature ought to amount to a kind of cartography
or landscape painting. But as we will see in what follows, weird literature can help us to
develop an utterly different, if  not less important, critical conception of the role of
literature as prompting us to think deeply about reality of the places that we inhabit.
3 One problem with dismissing supernatural horror for its lack of ‘naturalism’ derives
from  a  lack  of  appreciation  on  the  part  of  naturalist  writers  and  critics  for  the
thoroughgoing idealism of their position. Naturalist writers and critics that confound
realism  and  naturalism  consistently  confuse  what  Timothy  Morton  might  call  the
natural and the Natural. The natural we might take to mean the reality beyond our
minds, the things of the world in their relation with one another. The Natural, on the
other hand, we might take to refer to this “outside” as it appears to reflecting subjects
via the mediation of our cultural, scientific, and linguistic representations. As Timothy
Morton  has  extensively  argued  in  his  Ecology  Without  Nature,  one  of  the  major
weaknesses of ecological writing and in particular the critical literature on this writing
has been its tendency to confound nature and Nature by engaging in what he calls
“eco-mimesis” (Morton 2009, 81), essentially the confusion of representations of things
with the things themselves ; Kant described this as “transcendental realism” (Kant B
518). The point is not that there is there is no ultimate autonomous reality outside of
our  heads,  but  rather  that  the  ideas  and  representations  that  we  have  about  this
reality, what we call “nature,” are not identical with the real, and in taking them to be
identical we precisely occult the real and so miss out on a deeper and perhaps more
satisfying form of realism. In other words, the nature that we think, and think that we
see, is a deformed version of the real, transformed by complex perceptual and cognitive
processes.  As  Graham  Harman  has  somewhat  paradoxically  put  it :  “nature  is  not
natural and can never be naturalized” (Harman 2005, 251). A deeper realism, then, is
not to be accomplished by focusing on what we call nature, but may paradoxically be
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achieved by lifting our gaze above or beyond nature to the real. Weirdly enough, this
meta-natural realism, not in its reality but in its expression, often seems to evoke what
we call the supernatural, if indeed we understand this word to designate something
that stands opposed to, or beyond, the Natural. 
4 The genius of horror and the supernatural precisely lies in its refusal to accept the
Natural  as  ultimate  or  identical  with  reality.  The  very  condition  of  possibility  for
supernatural horror is the acknowledgement of a gap between the real and the Natural
or naturalized. Weird fiction (a term that I will here use as synonymous with horror,
after the habit established by Lovecraft and S.T. Joshi) is weird or veered precisely as an
expression  of  fidelity  towards  the  real  as  that  which  demands  a  veering  of,  or
deformation of, the natural towards what Jeff VanderMeer might call weird naturalism.
1 Supernatural  horror,  in  other  words,  should be  of  interest  to  ecologists  precisely
because it is realist, but not Naturalist. Realism of this type keeps eco-critics focused on
things-in-themselves and not upon mere representations of those things. This demands
a great deal of critical rigor, but it also yields a heightened attentiveness to both the
text and the world that surrounds us, for few will deny that their senses have ever
achieved such knife-edge sharpness as they do in moments when they confront the
terrifying and unknown. Indeed, a higher awareness of this kind yields a very deep
ecology, an ecology that is not merely aware of the interconnection of objects that are
not human, but also of the strangeness and otherness of these objects and the places
that  their  intermeshing  generates.  As  Tom  Sparrow’s  object-oriented  re-reading  of
Levinas’ ethics has suggested, attention to otherness orients us towards the opening of
an authentically ethical relationship to our environments, since the otherness that we
are  attending  to  echoes  the  strangeness  of  other  human  beings  that  we  normally
attribute to their recognition-demanding capacity for spontaneous, and moral, actions.
Therefore we are forced to see the world around us as radically independent of our own
will  and  designs.  Aside  from  allowing  us  to  develop  an  ethical  approach  towards
thinking about the otherness of places and objects, developing a mode of ecocriticism
adequate to dealing with weird writing allows for the elaboration of critical and not
dogmatic forms of eco-critical practice, since it is the gap between the real and the
natural that opens the space for a criticism that does more than envision literature
simply as a sweetened means for delivering the dry truths of scientific discoveries, but
rather as an art that alludes to an all-important yet obscure reality to which we must
learn to attend.
5 It is clear that the kind of realism at work in horror fiction is of a special kind that has
little to do with what would ordinarily be called realism in literature. Borrowing a term
from Graham Harman (2012), I call the realism of horror weird realism. Weird realism
involves the insistence that there is a reality outside and beyond the senses, while at
the same time claiming that  this  reality can,  in occult  and incomprehensible  ways,
interfere with and challenge our reality, altering it and transforming it in sometimes
inscrutable,  contingent,  or weirdly super-Natural  ways.  In weird realism, the object
outside experience does exist, and it exists wholly independently of our experience or
even our logic. As Jeff VanderMeer, for instance, explains, with reference to his weird
naturalism, we live on “an alien planet filled with incredibly sophisticated organisms
that  we  only  partially  understand…our  so-called  smart-phones  and other  advanced
technology is incredibly dull and primitive next to the diversity and intensity of other
life on Earth”. (VanderMeer 2014) Yet if we cannot, and do not, fully understand these
sophisticated organisms, they can nevertheless affect or influence that experience and
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logic in ways that do not wholly make sense to us. Thus the real,  while never fully
present to our minds or our senses, appears to us as dark, weird, veered, or uncanny.
Reckoning  with  the  fact  that  reality  is  sometimes  stranger  than  fiction,  however,
sometimes means accepting that the actual can be confounded with the delusions of an
unhealthy mind. 
6 As a literary strategy, this weirdness in part expresses itself in the supernatural, which
is of course that which is veered or “off” with respect to what counts as the normal or
natural. But it can also articulate itself in various rhetorical strategies aimed at either
expressing  the  outside  or  repressing  the  almost  automatic  mechanisms  of
naturalization  that  interpose  themselves  between  places  and  their  representations.
Very often, then, weird descriptions of place are indeed written about writing, their
target being as much the critique of the forgetting of the real in naïve naturalism as it
is the expression of reality in any straightforward sense. The product of these weird
expressions of place is not knowledge, as in the case of science or naturalistic writing,
but rather attunement, a straining after or intensified awareness of the presence of
others that also relate, beyond our perceptions and cognitions, amongst themselves,
and so form places. We might say that this is an awareness, and not a knowledge, of the
weird reality of ecosystems.
7 It would be unnecessary to cultivate our awareness of these weird realms if reality itself
did not possess this structure. Yet one of the most salient facts about life in what Paul
Crutzen and a growing mass of social scientists, historians, and literary critics call the
Anthropocene is precisely our growing awareness of the gap between the cosmos as it
appears to us and its depths.2 We are all aware that the spring of 2014 was incredibly
snowy to residents of  the northeastern United States,  and yet it  was also the same
period in which the American Academy of Sciences confirmed that the climate had
already warmed by two degrees. We are all—I hope—disturbed by the fact that the juicy
red tomato that we buy at the store is actually filled with carcinogenic pesticides. We
know,  thanks to  work of  cognitive scientists  like  Andrew Clark,  that  our perceived
world is a reduction of the total background to a few selected signs, a world that differs
in degree but not in kind from the famously reduced world of the tick described by Von
Uexküll. We should not feel that nothing happens to the world when we turn on our
cars,  though we often do forget  that  this  simple and seemly inconsequential  act  is
responsible  for  adding  invisible  CO2  particles  into  our  atmosphere.  These  are  all,
admittedly, gaps that are glimpsed between the Nature of science and the Nature of the
lifeworld of ordinary perception, but they do remind us of the horrifying uncanniness
of  the  cosmos,  and  the  complicity  of  our  ordinary  ways  of  perceiving  in  the
perpetuation of our collective ecocide. In sum, the fracturing of our world supports the
weird realist  speculation that  there  is  more to  the world than is  dreamt of  in  our
(naturalist) philosophy.
8 The following essay is  divided into two parts.  The first  sections offer a compressed
genealogy of the development of weird realist vision in the work of three writers of
cosmic horror : Poe, Lovecraft, and Jeff VanderMeer. The latter half of the text, largely
in dialogue with VanderMeer, explores more profoundly the interest of weird writing
for thinking about and living in the increasingly horrifying and uncanny age that is the
Anthropocene.
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Poe and the Obscurity of Objects and their
Connections
9 Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” begins with a description of a place
and its effects upon a person. Poe is quite specific about the time and the ambiance, the
specifics  of  his  experience.  It  was “the autumn of  the year,”  and the “clouds hung
oppressively  low  in  the  heavens,”  he  passed  through  “a  singularly  dreary  tract  of
country,” and he finally found himself “within view of the melancholy House of Usher”
(Poe 199). Upon first sight of this place—this house so queerly described as not just
inspiring melancholy in the viewer but as itself melancholic, the narrator remarks “a
sense of insufferable gloom pervaded my spirit.” The narrator then goes on to reflect
upon the strange power of this place upon the person, wondering how the scene before
him “the mere house, and the simple landscape features of the domain” “the bleak
walls”  “the  vacant  eye-like  windows”  “a  few  rank  sedges”  “a  few  white  trunks  of
decayed trees” could so affect him, likening their effect upon him to the “after-dream
of  the  reveler  upon opium” in  their  “bitter  lapse  into  everyday life,”  the “hideous
dropping of the veil” (199). 
10 The dread that pervades the narrator is  not presented as a dream or delusion,  but
precisely as an encounter with reality. The choice of analogies brings this out, not only
because the narrator associates the queer reality of the house with ordinary reality,
with what most of us would call the real itself and not the drug-fueled daydream. The
same inversion is suggested by the figure of the veil, a trope that, as Pierre Hadot has
explored, was long used in alchemical and other occult circles to refer to the concealed
secret orders of the natural world. The reason behind this replacement of the ordinary
with the dream world is clarified by a nearly philosophical claim that is introduced in
the lines that follow. Asking himself  how and why this building so affects him, the
narrator comes upon what he calls an “unsatisfactory conclusion,” namely that there
are  “combinations  of  very  simple  natural  objects  which  have  the  power  of  thus
affecting  us,  still  the  analysis  of  this  power  lies  among  considerations  beyond  our
depth”(199). Without denying that this line is indeed obscure, let us say that it is clear
enough to open up a rather rich field of speculations into the metaphysical notions
crucial to thinking about horror and place. 
11 Horror writer and theorist Thomas Ligotti has suggested that human awareness of the
alien nature of objects, the sensation that “the objects around them were one thing and
that  they  were  another,”  led  to  the  birth  of  horror  (Ligotti  1).  It  is  the  uncanny
doubling of the objects of perception of this kind that seems to fuel Poe’s imagination.
All  that appears to us as subjects is a unified object,  that is to say, drawing on the
Husserlian doctrine  of  intentionality,  a  discrete  and unified  entity  as  opposed to  a
bundle of discrete qualities. Objects surround us always, and they compose to a certain
extent  the  most  familiar  elements  of  our  existence.  We  might  count  amongst  the
objects—at least in the technical philosophical sense—all that we know via experience :
houses, animals, floors, people. But though common, objects are obscure and sources of
obscurity. Objects do not remain fixed when we encounter them, live with them, or
even merely attempt to pick them up. Objects slip through our fingers in both a literal
and theoretical sense, and when they do they reveal more of themselves to us, present
us with new depths and concealed aspects, aspects of the object independent from any
theoretical or practical grasp that we might have of them, but which might matter with
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respect to the combinations that they can compose. Even what seems most present to
us, the objects around us, our surroundings, are apt to dupe us, to seem one thing and
to actually be another. The chair in the corner of the room might turn out to be a
statue made of Styrofoam. The girl staring at me from a window across the street might
turn out to be a mannequin or a machine, as in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “Der Sandman”. No
object is ever revealed to us in its totality, each has another perspective from which it
might be viewed, or a concealed otherness, and that is only speaking of the object from
the  viewpoint  of  a  vision  without  dynamism.  As  Poe’s  countryman  and  near
contemporary Emerson puts it, in his “Experience” : 
I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which lets them slip through our
fingers  then  when  we  clutch  hardest,  to  be  the  most  unhandsome  part  of  our
condition. Nature does not like to be observed, and likes that we should be her fools
and playmates (Emerson 20). 
12 The  lubricity  of  objects,  particularly  when  they  are  seen  in  terms  of  their
interconnections, allows us to acknowledge that the real may stand beyond the set of
norms and regularities  that  we have up to  this  point  understood to  constitute  the
natural  order.  David  Hume,  one  of  the  towering intellectual  figures  of  the  century
preceding  Poe’s,  brings  this  point  out  clearly  in  his  Enquiry  Concerning  Human
Understanding.  According to Hume, “no object ever discovers, by the qualities which
appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise
from it” (Hume 111). More to the point, without experience—something always in short
supply, since future experience can always contradict past experience—we can never
draw  any  “inference  concerning  real  existence  and  matter  of  fact”  from  a  simple
encounter with an object.  Following Hume,  then,  it  is  a  real  logical  possibility that
effects that seem totally fantastic follow from causes that we have a false tendency to
consider as logically evident because they are concordant with past experience. Why,
for instance, should one billiard ball necessarily impart its motion to another ? “May I
not conceive,” writes Hume, 
that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause ? May not both
these balls remain at absolute rest ? May not the first ball return in a straight line,
or leap off from the second in any line or direction ? All  these suppositions are
consistent and conceivable (112).
13 All of these possibilities are conceivable, just as all  sorts of supernatural effects are
logically possible given the gap between reality and our representations of the real.
14 Metaphysically  speaking,  then,  Poe’s  reflection  on  the  obscure  possibilities  set  in
motion by certain combinations of objects opens up the way for an account of reality in
which what we call the natural is but one interpretation of past possibility, and not in
any  way  an  expression  of  the  ultimate  nature  of the  real.  Of  course  we  are  here
speaking about a metaphysical possibility with respect to how we imagine reality, and
this in turn yields a point of rupture between two different approaches to the writing of
fiction, and indeed, to the reading of Poe. On the one hand, our inadequate hold on the
real generates fictions that examine the mental state of individuals tortured by their
obsessions with realities that do not exist,  as seems to be the case,  for example,  in
Maupassant’s Le horla, and may merely be the case in Poe. This would be the tradition
described by S.T. Joshi as “psychological horror” (Joshi 7). On the other hand, there is
the  school  of  writing  perhaps  most  prominently  exemplified  by  Lovecraft  and  his
followers, “cosmic horror.” In cosmic horror, madness is present, but this madness is
generated by a violence exercised by “outer, unknown forces” (Lovecraft 1973, 15). The
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result of this encounter with the real is a deformation of the subject, but it is not this
that interests the writer of cosmic horror ; rather, it is the wild figures that that the
imagination generates in its encounters with the real that interests the cosmic horror
writer. The figure that expresses this real in Poe’s “Usher” is the animated outside, not
so much a world haunted by human ghosts, but a world in which rocks and stones have
a kind of  “sentience,”  a  certain spontaneity  that  allows them to act  outside of  the
conditioning of natural law, just as humans conceived as ethical agents are supposedly
capable of doing. It is this animation that explains the queer lawlessness of descriptions
of the house of Usher, the “wild inconsistency” between the “still perfect adaptation of
parts,” of the masonry “and the crumbling condition of the individual stones” (201).
Yet if Poe’s writing opens up to a sketching of the real as animate, and thus as a real
that  in  many  ways  resonates  with  the  kinds  of  neo-animism  defined  by  certain
ecological thinkers today (I am thinking in particular of Timothy Morton (2013) and
Eduardo Kohn), his exploration in this direction is also limited by his focus upon the
psychological  aspects  of  horror.  This  tight  focus  on  psychology  was  not  shared  by
Lovecraft,  however,  who once wrote that he had no interest  in “man’s  relations to
man,” but only our relationship to the “cosmos,” or, as he added by way of clarification,
the  “background” and not  the  “earth”  (Lovecraft  1995,  155)  as  it  is  understood by
humankind. 
 
Lovecraft, (Non)locality, and Madness
THE MOST MERCIFUL THING in the world, I think, is the inability of the human
mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the
midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The
sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little ; but
some  day  the  piecing  together  of  dissociated  knowledge  will  open  up  such
terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either
go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety
of a new dark age. “The Call of Cthulhu” (Lovecraft 2008, 201)
15 Lovecraft’s interest in the “background,” what in the above citation from “The Call of
Cthuhlu” he terms the “terrifying vistas of reality,” is clearly attested to by his extreme
attention to place and setting in his writing, his frequent indulgence in what must be
considered the weird equivalent of verbal landscape painting. That said, there is very
little in Lovecraft’s descriptions of place that corresponds to the kind of ecomimetic
rendering of the landscape that Don Scheese has insisted is central to nature writing.
As  Lovecraft’s  almost  Heideggerian  opposition  between  “earth”  and  “background”
makes clear, his interest is in deeper and weirder topographies, not the world as it
appears to us as we normally experience it, but the world as it is in its ultimate and
deeper dimensions.3
16 Lovecraft’s evocations of place, in what S.T. Joshi has called Lovecraft’s “topographical
imagination” (Joshi 7), are dedicated to disrupting our normal sense of being at home
in the world. They do sketch out and allude to a reality that is supposed to be more
ultimate  than  our  own—and  in  this  way  they  remain  weirdly  realist—but  they  as
frequently or  simultaneously serve to point  out  the chinks in our “placid island of
ignorance.” Lovecraft’s writings set up almost Platonic ladders of mediation between
narrators and the tales themselves, thereby introducing the specter of psychology and
all  of  its  associated  distance-taking  from  the  real.  Nevertheless,  the  mind  is  here
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introduced in such a way as to render the real all the more horrifying, since the mind is
seen as blocking us from seeing what is actually there. In Lovecraft it is never madness
that engenders the experience of the real, but rather the encounter with the real that
provokes fits of madness. Madness is thus the testament and seal of having experienced
the real. In “Dreams in the Witch House,” for instance, we are first confronted with the
conundrum  of  whether  Walter  Gilman’s  dreams  cause  the  fever  or the  fever  the
dreams,  but  we  are  then  told  that  both  alternatives  are  insignificant,  for  “behind
everything crouched the brooding, festering horror of the ancient town, and of the
mouldy, unhallowed garret gable where he wrote and studied and wrestled with figures
and formulae when he was not tossing on the meagre iron bed” (Lovecraft 2008, 358).
The background here is  the foreground,  or  more properly,  is  a  character,  animate,
“crouched,” “brooding,” “festering” (358). Moreover, as an animate being, the place is
unaccountable, granted will, spontaneity, and the capacity to be acknowledged and to
demand acknowledgment.
17 Yet if the background is a real being, an autonomous actor, the depiction of the place
provided to us by Lovecraft via Gilman tells us as much about our limits with respect to
our  becoming  aware  of  places  and  their  populations  as  it  does  about  the  actual
character of the old house. We are first told, for example, of “the sinister scurrying of
rats,” the “creaking of the hidden timbers in the centuried house,” but also of sounds
that  are  alluded  to  but  not  properly  expressed,  “unexplained  sound,”  and  indeed
“certain other  fainter  noises,  which he suspected,  were lurking behind them”(358).
Within the context of the tale, it is important to note that we will soon discover that
the seeming rats are not quite rats, but rather rat-like beings with human hands for
paws, which is to say that our apparent identification of the sounds as rat-sounds is
itself undone, itself part of the mechanism of consciousness that we humans rely on,
but which can be fallible at any instant. Meanwhile, quite aside from this description of
ambient noise that turns out to be erroneously familiar, part of the description turns
on sounds that are inexplicable and hardly to be signified, and also sounds that are only
suspected (it turns out rightly), but unheard. 
18 As a means of expressing place, then, Lovecraft constantly steps over the boundaries of
our perception, vaguely hinting to us the details of an outside or ultimate reality, while
at the same time rendering us acutely aware of the finitude of our grasp on the real. In
Lovecraft’s  early  work,  such  as  for  instance  in  “The  Music  of  Erich  Zann,”  the
relationship  between  mind  and  world,  text  and  real,  is  articulated  through  a
confounding of our sense of place and time. This results in our inability to locate or
cognitively situate a place via a narrative about a street that the narrator cannot find
even after  having “examined maps  with  greatest  care,”  even when he  has  “delved
deeply  into  all  of  the  antiquities  of  the  place”  and has  “personally  explored every
region, of whatever name, which could possibly answer to the street”(58) that he knew
as Rue D’Auseil. Surely we are tempted to find the un-localizability of the Rue D’Auseil
as evidence of its purely fictive nature, as a kind of subjective delusion of the narrator,
but  this  reduction of  the street  to  fiction is  in no way justified,  since its  existence
outside place and time, as weird as it seems, actually can be read as serving as a proof
of  its  transcendental  reality.  At  least  since  Kant,  and  quite  explicitly  since
Schopenhauer, it has been theorized that it is us who “represent things as extended,”
which is to say that independently of our representations, “nothing extended can be
present” (Schopenhauer 20). In other words, real things, like the Rue D’Auseil, are in
themselves  outside  of  time  and  space  as  we  represent  and  understand  these
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transcendental  intuitions.  Significantly  enough,  the  Rue D’Auseil  is  almost—but  not
quite—readable as “street at the threshold” (Rue d’Au Seuil),  a name which perfectly
corresponds to the metaphysical status of the place named both in terms of what it
suggests and what it does not confirm, namely the real status of the Rue d’Auseil as a
liminal place, something that hovers between being simply unreal and the impossible
coming-to-presence of the ultimately-extensionless real.
19 Of course, one of the problems with positing the real as outside of time and space is
that it renders expression difficult, since language itself expresses things in terms of
temporal and spatial relations (verb tenses and prepositions). Rather than expressing
or sounding the reality of the Rue D’Auseil, then, “The Music of Erich Zann” can go
little farther in its description of reality than presenting us with an enigma, a place on
the  threshold  of  being  on  the  threshold.  In  Lovecraft’s  later  work,  however,  we
encounter a richer strain of weird realist writing that bears us upward on a ladder of
degrees of spatiality. In the abovementioned “In the Witch House,” for instance, we
read that Gilman lives in a room of “good size but of queerly irregular shape ; the north
wall slanting perceptibly inward from the outer to the inner end, while the low ceiling
slanted  gently  downward  in  the  same  direction”  (360).  Considered  closely,  this
description is much weirder than one is prepared for. What, after all, is meant by the
outer and inner ends of the north wall ? How can a ceiling slant downward in the same
direction that a wall slants outward ? Is this not somehow a confounding of the vertical
and the horizontal ? We find similar weird spatialities in the “Call of Cthuhlu,” where
we are told of something “like a great barn-door” but which seemed to ambiguously lie
“flat like a trap-door or slantwise like an outside cellar-door” (223). At another point in
the same tale we discover that “the geometry of the place was all wrong,” that the
“relative position” of everything seemed “phantasmally variable” (223). What is going
on here ? It seems that we are encountering things that shatter all knowable categories.
Yet at  the same time, these texts are peppered with references to Einstein,  Planck,
Heisenberg, and Riemann. Alongside these names we find references to non-Euclidean
geometry and space-time, weird theories explaining 
possible freakish curvatures in space, and of Theoretical points of approach or even
contact between our part of the cosmos and various other regions as distant as the
farthest stars or the transgalactic gulfs themselves—or even as fabulously remote as
the tentatively conceivable cosmic units beyond the whole Einsteinian space-time
continuum. (363) 
20 Of the weird geometry of the room in the Witch House we are told that the “the odd
angles” seem to have “a mathematical significance” (360). In the “Call of Cthulhu,” we
are told that the geometry of the place “was abnormal, non-Euclidean, and loathsomely
redolent of spheres and dimensions apart from ours” (222). When we look at diagrams
attempting to render non-Euclidean or Reimanian space visible, we recognize that it is
exactly these weird dimensions of the real that Lovecraft has in mind in his contorted
phrases.  In short,  the weird realism of Lovecraft’s writing gains depth as it  tries to
render scientific or mathematical realities present to us in and through the limited
means of ordinary language and perception.
21 The point is not that Lovecraft is simply trying to describe the world as it is seen by
science, within a language and for a subjectivity adapted to describing what Wilfred
Sellars (1963) has called the “manifest image” of the world. For Lovecraft, weird fiction
must  always  go  beyond  the  logical  and  the  known,  and  that  is  to  say  beyond
mathematics and science.4 The real point has more to do with the ways in which our
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scientific knowledge of these deeper dimensions of reality already humiliate us, already
demonstrating that our ordinary reality is delusive, thus opening up the possibility of a
speculative sounding of depths that will be yet more real, and that is to say yet less
idealized, less formed, as it were, to correspond to the limited and limiting spatial and
temporal capacities of our brains.
22 Lovecraft’s weird realist artistry does not end with his manipulations of time and space.
He is arguably at his best when he veers close to what might seem to be apparently
normal eco-mimetic writing, namely his weird regionalist evocations of the Miskatonic
region, a place that in many ways seems like his native New England, and which within
his fictions is precisely located in an indefinite proximity to Boston and other known
locales.  In “The Dunwich Horror,” the first  paragraph of the tale is  thus an almost
ordinary description of travelling a New England country road : 
When  a  traveller  in  north  central  Massachusetts  takes  the  wrong  fork  at  the
junction of the Aylesbury pike just beyond Dean’s Corners he comes upon a lonely
and curious country. The ground gets higher, and the brier-bordered stone walls
press closer and closer against the ruts of the dusty, curving road. The trees of the
frequent forest belts seem too large,  and the wild weeds,  brambles,  and grasses
attain a luxuriance not often found in settled regions. At the same time the planted
fields appear singularly few and barren ; while the sparsely scattered houses wear a
surprisingly uniform aspect of age, squalor, and dilapidation. (264-265).
23 Here  everything seems as  if  we are  in  some known region,  here  everything seems
ordinary, even if the names correspond to places that do not actually exist. But if they
do not exist,  they could,  or even could have, since the names used come from real
places in Old England, and thus seem familiar even in their distance from the actual
and known New England.  As  those  of  us  who have  visited  or  lived  in  Vermont  or
Western Massachusetts may acknowledge, when reading Lovecraft’s descriptions it is
easy to feel lulled into thinking that we know this place, that we are actually travelling
through the New England that we know, a world with which we are familiar and at
home. But as the description goes on, we seem to cross over a threshold ; Lovecraft
marks the passage with a “rise in the road” that brings “the mountains into view above
the deep woods.” It is here that the first truly weird things appear : “The summits are
too rounded and symmetrical to give a sense of comfort and naturalness” (265). Here
what  is  stretched is  not  so  much language—it  is  possible  to  imagine  mountains  as
rounded—but  precisely  our  pretension  to  know  the  world.  Rather  than  trying  to
describe a real that does not fit within our ordinary faculties of representation and
perception, Lovecraft here presents us with a real that is, as it were, too rational. It is as
if he is suggesting that the very idea of circumscribing the real with the rational is
bound  to  fail,  since  the  very  representation  of  the  real  when  it  is  presented  as
geometrically  rational  is  absurd,  as  absurd  as  would  be  a  field  of  quintessentially
identical dandelions, perfectly similar maple leaves, or ontologically indifferent cattle.
And  yet  these  things  are  the  real,  as  reality  is  thought  using  ordinary  language,
scientific models, and ‘healthy’ rationality. Therein is expressed one of the terrors of
our current situation, our deep awareness of the looming environmental crisis coupled
with our awareness of the ways in which the limits of our minds hinder our every
attempt to master  or  rationally  model  the world around us.  Rather than becoming
masters and possessors of nature, we slowly realize that we are possessed by nature,
and that nature, for want to a better word, is possessed, ready to annihilate us for the
unthinking ways in which we have tried to impose our mark upon the real.
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Annihilation and the Weird Ecosystems of Area X
Some types of omissions made my mind itch as much as more explicit offerings.
One journal, half-destroyed by the damp, focused solely on the qualities of a kind of
thistle with a lavender blossom that grew in the hinterlands between forest and
swamp. Page after page described encountering first one specimen of this thistle
and then another, along with minute details about the insects and other creatures
that occupied that microhabitat. In no instance did the observer stray more than a
foot or two from a particular plant, and at no point, either, did the observer pull
back to provide a glimpse of base camp or their own life. After a while, a kind of
unease came over me as I began to perceive a terrible presence hovering in the
background of these entries. I saw the Crawler or some surrogate approaching in
that space just beyond the thistle, and the single focus of the journal keeper a way
of coping with that horror. An absence is not a presence, but still with each new
depiction  of  a  thistle,  a  shiver  worked  deeper  and  deeper  into  my  spine.
(VanderMeer 2014 b, 114)
24 Jeff VanderMeer openly admits that the setting for his recent novel Annihilation is the
Saint Marks National Wildlife Refuge. It is perhaps for this reason that much of the
novel, which  he  himself  has  described  as  “weird  nature  writing”  (2014  c),  recalls
traditional nature writing in its  content and its  form. The narrator of the text is  a
biologist and many of her place descriptions are dotted not only with descriptions of
particular flora and fauna, but also with extensive discussions of ecosystems, habitats,
and taxonomy. Yet there is also a weirder, deeper dimension to VanderMeer’s writing.
As in the text above, he seems to look too closely at things, to discover their weirdness
and terror, not their familiarity and presence. The objects and places of St. Marks, as
filtered through the writing, thus evoke to us an alien landscape that persists behind
the visible and familiar South Florida scenery. Every word presents us with a shadow, a
dark presence that hangs behind it. What is written might be described as presented
“sous rature,” as Derrida might put it, referring to Heidegger’s famous choice of writing
Sein with an x over it, a gesture intended to signify that what is normally called Being
(Heidegger writes “Being” is  indeed the erasure of  being “Being,” by which we are
supposed to recognize that in reading Being we are misrepresenting to ourselves what
is).5 This is writing, then, that appropriately for a place whose name itself—Area X—
suggests the notion of erasure, that cultivates omissions and allusions ;  writing that
reminds us  of  dimensions of  place that  are absent  from both the setting and from
ordinary perception, and which yet constitute something like the dark presences so
powerfully evoked by Lovecraft.  This  strange tension between the mimetic and the
barred articulation of the weird real is perfectly showcased in the book’s first lines : 
The tower, which was not supposed to be there, plunges into the earth in a place
just before the black pine forest begins to give way to swamp and then the reeds
and wind-gnarled trees of the marsh flats. Beyond the marsh flats and the natural
canals lies the ocean and, a little farther down the coast, a derelict lighthouse. (3)
25 Reading carelessly, we might feel adequately oriented by these lines. They describe a
landscape, a black pine forest, a swamp, reeds and trees. We feel not only as if we are
viewing a panorama of this landscape, but also as if we are reading a map, receiving
indications that could potentially help us find ourselves in this place. But then there is
the strange dissonance in the part about the tower. What, after all, does it mean for
something  to  “not  be  supposed”  to  be  someplace ?  Later  we  are  given  a  partial
clarification—the tower is not on the map that the explorers were given when they
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were briefed on the expedition. But this absence of the tower from the map does not
annul the mystery of the object, but rather heightens it, prompting us to wonder why
and how the tower was not included on maps beforehand. Of course that is not the only
thing that the line introduces in terms of cognitive dissonance. After all, a tower is a
thing that extends up out of the ground, and yet this ‘tower’ is said to plunge into the
earth. The tower would thus seem to be inverted, indeed to be something other than a
tower, perhaps to be a tunnel, which is indeed what some of the other characters in the
story do call it, albeit not the narrator. The effect of this cumulative confusion is to
suggest that whatever it is does not fit with any of our names or descriptions, that it is
a thing with no proper analogue in our language and no proper precursor in our past
perceptions. As such, the term “tower” as well as the object to which it alludes fail to
give the orientation that they seemed to offer upon a cursory reading. Instead they
render the entire place a zone of disorientation, though this disorientation might be
said to spring not from an absence of reality, but from an excess of the real. 
26 The weird typography employed by Heidegger is intended to evoke the making-present
of the non-present in such a way as to remind us of the consummate inadequacy of this
making-present. This in turn suggests to us that the “real” Real is beyond that which is
presented  to  us,  situated  in  a  withdrawn  place  that  cannot  be  reached  via  the
categories of language or even the categories of our perception. It does not mean that
we are not aware of it, only that our versions of it are somehow pale reflections of its
reality. To partially quote from another volume of VanderMeer’s, it means that we “we
lack  the  analogies”  (2014  a,  523).  In  Annihilation,  we  almost  constantly  seem  to
encounter words that describe objects that do not quite fit with these words, weird or
strained analogies that leave us with the general impression that they emerge not so
much from a failure of descriptions to match what is seen but from a failure of the
categories  that  structure  and  order  our  perceptions  to  bring  the  objects  into  full
phenomenal presence. While exploring the tower/tunnel, for instance, the narrator has
the bizarre experience of encountering words composed of miniscule flora and fauna.
She  notes  that  the  entities  that  they  are  composed  of  “would  have  looked  to  the
layperson like rich green fernlike moss” but she quickly makes clear that to her trained
view they are “in fact” “probably” something else, “a type of fungi or other eukaryotic
organism” (24). In this quick precision we immediately feel at ease, for the clarifying
and orienting powers of science are at hand. But then the writing becomes weirder, and
in a certain sense more realist, grasping not at the analogue of this thing and other
things  categorized  in  the  past,  but  for  this  thing  in  its  pure  presence.  We  have  a
description that seems to depict the object as it is seen, but then that description seems
to break down into mere metaphors,  as if  the object itself  were deconstructing our
categories : “The curling filaments were all packed very close together and rising out
from the wall. A loamy smell came from the words along with an underlying hint of
rotting honey. This miniature forest swayed, almost imperceptibly, like sea grass in a
gentle  ocean  current”  (24).  Unlike  ordinary  nature  writing,  which  in  Tom  Lyons’s
words brings about a “lifting or clarifying of perception” of the environment (Lyons
25), moving from confused observations to a precise understanding of the organization
of ecosystems, this writing seems to make our perception at once muddier and more
profound. In this case, the more vividly we seem to see the thing, the less sense that we
have of  its  being clearly nameable or even identifiable.  Indeed its  vividness is  only
achieved through the negation of reference to the thing and via an allusion to a wholly
other object. The muddiness and the depth of this object also go together when we
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consider it in its relation to the ecosystem as such. Making sense of these organisms
depends  upon  our  making  sense  of  the  other  organisms  with  which  they  live  and
interact. Yet given that the tunnel includes also other unknown denizens, and depths
that are unplumbed, it is the totality of the place that becomes at once more present
and more obscure and horrifying in the encounter with these weird letters.
27 VanderMeer’s narrator is a biologist and at many times in the text she looks at the
world through a  scientific  perspective.  Yet  what  scientists  do  to  create  order  is  to
impose limits, separating the known and knowable from the unknown and irrelevant.
Ecologist and nature writer George Haskell, for instance, decides to study what he calls
a “mandala,” a circle in the forest in order to make sense of the larger forest itself. As
Haskell explains, “I believe the forest’s ecological stories are all present in a mandala-
sized area… the truth of the forest may be more clearly and vividly revealed by the
contemplation of a small area than it could be by donning ten-league boots, covering a
continent…”  (Haskell  xi).  While  it  may  be  well  and  true  that  conceptual  clarity  is
achieved through such delimitation, it is also true that limits marking place are always
arbitrary. They are always either geometric abstractions that have nothing to do with
the lived being of the place (as is the case with the perfectly circular and self-evidently
spiritual  Mandala,  or  with  a  political  demarcation  cut  along  a  line  of  latitude  or
longitude),  or,  if  they  are  rooted  in  ecotopes  or  bioregions  such  as the  Pacific
Northwest as seen by Gary Snyder, they are to a certain degree undefined. Do we know,
for instance, when a swamp ecosystem ends and a beach ecosystem begins ? Is it the
last Douglas Fir that marks the end of the ecosystem of the Douglas Fir, or, rather, are
the limits marked by the last insect that exists in a symbiotic relationship with this
tree ? And what about the other beings that exist in relationship to that insect ? Where
is the absolute point of transition ? These are questions that we could pose about the
ontological status of our scientific knowledge of the real ; these are questions explicitly
generated by the weird character of VanderMeer’s Area X, which paradoxically is said
to  be  composed  of  all  transitional  ecosystems.  That  is  to  say,  ecosystems  that  are
neither of one or another sort, ecosystems that are somehow of two kinds at once and
which are neither at once, ecosystems that confront us with the multiplicity of the real
in its disorder rather than a reduction of this real into order via artificial delimitations
and interpretative frameworks. 
28 It  is  perhaps  then  a  commitment  to  irreductionism  that  is  most  evident  in
VanderMeer’s descriptions of Area X. His writing does not so much strive to exhaust all
of the details of the surroundings, nor repeatedly re-articulate the same details (as in
the text quoted above which describes obsessively the thistle),  but rather strives to
speak about this world while perpetually reminding us that what we see is a reduction
of  the  real  to  an  instrumentalized  and  partial  version  of  the  same.  VanderMeer
articulates perfectly the tension between knowledge as reduction, and the wonder of
the pure if  also  obscure presence,  in  an episode in  which the biologist,  before  her
coming to Area X, encounters the aptly named “destroyer of worlds” starfish. Staring
down at this real but seemingly alien creature, the narrator finds that the longer she
stares, “the less comprehensible the creature became”. It transforms into “something
alien,” that gives her the “sense” that she “knew nothing at all— about nature, about
ecosystems. There was something about my mood and its dark glow that eclipsed sense,
that  made  me  see  this  creature,  which  had  indeed  been  assigned  a  place  in  the
taxonomy—  catalogued,  studied,  and  described—  irreducible  down  to  any  of  that”
(175). My interest in this passage derives from the connection between this falling away
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of all that makes sense, all that makes up our ordered cosmos and indeed our world,
and the encounter with the pure obscurity and intensity of  the starfish.  This  is  an
incredibly rare event, for as Heidegger has reminded us, we almost always experience
things as objects known and oriented around us as subjects. We do not hear “noise” and
“complexes  of  sound”  but  rather  “the  column  on  the  march,  the  north  wind,  the
knocking of the woodpecker, and the crackling fire” (Heidegger 2001, 163). It is rare,
almost impossible, to have these sorts of breakdowns without a destroyer of worlds, an
alien  thing  that  ruptures  our  tranquility  and  finally  shatters  our  subjectivity,  or,
perhaps, what would be better put, our Da-Sein, our being there. This alien can just be
another, an Other being whose world we take to be real, at least as real as our own, but
which we recognize that we do not share, that we cannot share, and that therefore we
must weirdly or awkwardly co-inhabit with. It can also be, and is for Heidegger, the
work of art, that thing that creates a tear or gap or Riß in being. It is, for horror, that
zone  in  the  interior  of  the  enchanted  circle,  that  weird  place  where  all  that  is
horrifying happens.
29 The biologist-narrator follows up her reaction to the starfish by reflecting on herself :
“And if I kept looking, I knew that ultimately I would have to admit I knew less than
nothing about myself as well,  whether that was a lie or the truth” (175).  The word
Dasein,  for  Heidegger,  is  synonymous  with  the  being  of  the  human,  but  it  also
articulates a sense of being that is always situated, always in a place, and only capable
of coming to knowledge of the self in combination with a coming to awareness of the
nature of that place. As Jeff Malpas has explained, summarizing much of what he has
elaborated upon in his work on Heidegger’s topology : 
Subjectivity  cannot  be  grasped  independently  of  a  larger  structure  that
encompasses other subjects as well as the objects and events of the world. It is, we
can say, in the dense structure of place that subjectivity is embedded and, inasmuch
as subjectivity is only to be found within such a structure, so there is a necessary
dependence of subjectivity on the other elements within that structure and on the
structure as it whole.” (Malpas 2009, 175)
30 The encounter with the weird real thus brings about the dissolution of the subject, a
collapse or foundering of self-knowledge. But if this is all the case, then the weird real
also  makes  us  conscious,  as  in  the  lines  above,  of  the  fact  of  our  consciousness  as
reductive. It is hence in itself a thing of danger to our ecological well being, since it is
productive  of  an  illusory  knowledge  of  place,  where  the  reality  itself  lies  further
outside.
31 This is exactly the trap that is encouraged by nature writing and indeed by much of
ecological philosophy. When we strive to render ourselves conscious of the ways in
which  we  are  bound  up  in  this  world,  following  nature  writers  and  certain  eco-
phenomenologists such as David Abram, we may feel that we have replaced a more
typical or alienated opposition between subjects and objects with one in which humans
and things  are  tightly  bound in  relationships  of  mutual  co-implication.  Abram,  for
instance, claims in his Becoming Animal that we can attain such an attunement that “our
bodies  resonate  with  one  another  and  with  the  other  rhythms  that surround us”
(Abram 11). Yet at best, such an attunement amounts to so perfect an integration into
the world of the “there” that the withdrawn or obscure is forgotten. We might have
become the world, but the world here is only the one that we encounter, and it is thus
conditioned  and  diminished  by  the  limits  of  human  embodiment  and  human
subjectivity. The gaps or holes in being, with their alienation of the subject from its
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being there, are forgotten, as if they were not, in fact, there. Yet there are other bodies,
and as such other sensual worlds, parts of the world that are real without being us. 
32 Perhaps the limits of the naturalistic real must correspond to the limits of our bodies,
but the bounds of the real as such must include the possibility of thinking other sorts of
embodied  worlds  as  sharing  the  background  with  us.  It  is  this  possibility  of
experiencing what might be described as alterioembodiment and alterioperception that
occurs in Area X. Not only does the encounter with the place break down the subject,
drawing the  subject  into  a  madness  that  derives  from contact  with  the  real  (as  in
Lovecraft), but the subject is also reconstituted in a new way, and in a new relationship
to the real, because the being there of the subject is different, diffused outside of the
body and into  the  environment,  such that  the  sensual  contact  with the  world,  the
being-there, is not situated within one body but diffused amongst multiple differently-
embodied bodies, while at the same time remaining tied to the original body, only now
in a risible or weird way. The biologist writes of being able to “feel the shifting of the
surveyor’s hips as she lay against the ground,” and that is to say that it was as if the
ground were not something that supported her own body but was rather her body
itself, a feeling and experiencing body. She speaks also of “tasting the yellow grass”
that the surveyor has crushed beneath her, of “hearing the sweat” (150) dripping down
her  face.  At  this  point  it  is  less  clear  where  and  in  what  avatar  body  this
alteriosensuality  is  situated,  or  even  what  kind  of  a  body  would  be  necessary  to
experience such sensations. What is clear is that the narrator is no longer a there-being
(a Da sein) bringing the environment to expression, but rather the environment as a
series  of  variably  and  incommensurably  embodied  beings  finds  itself  channeled
through one voice, a kind of around or Umsein (the German word for environment is
Umwelt).  Such  a  weird  subjectivity  is  of  course  disorienting,  rather  than  seeing  or
feeling oneself as discrete and yet connected to a pole or a there within being, this
Umself embraces multiple and incommensurate places at once, experiencing at one and
the same time limits and worlds  beyond those  limits,  void  and fullness  madly  and
dissonantly overlapping.
 
On Weird Realism and the Future of Ecology
“Looking out over that untroubled landscape, I do not believe any of us could yet
see the threat.” (VanderMeer 2014 b, 3)
33 These words, taken from the beginning of Annihilation, could be used to describe any
number of vistas and places participating in the ongoing crisis of the Anthropocene. “It
was a lovely neighborhood in a quiet residential area, with lots of trees and lots of
children outside playing. It seemed just the place for our family” (Gibbs 40), wrote Lois
Gibbs of  the superficial  appearance of  the neighborhood around the infamous Love
Canal.  Tom’s  River,  New  Jersey,  the  site  of  an  enormous  pollution-caused  cancer
cluster,  is  described by Dan Fagin as “no different from thousands of  other towns”
(Fagin xiv). Allen Weisman, when visiting Chernobyl, found himself discombobulated
by the experience of seeing birds—“barn swallows”—“zipping naked around the carcass
of the hot reactor” (Weisman 214), as if nature itself was going on normally despite the
disaster. His point was to emphasize that nature has the power to reclaim the world
after we are gone, but a more uncanny point might be made here, namely that the
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world  we  live  in  is  getting  ever  weirder,  the  disconnections  between  our  felt
experiences of places and their deeper realities ever more gaping.
34 Timothy Morton (2013) has thus described ours as the Age of Asymmetry. What he
means  by  this  is  that  we have  suddenly  entered an epoch where  the  gap between
appearances and realities has grown to the point that we no longer understand the
world of  the senses as the real  world,  but rather as a cover over another world of
depths that we can fathom with science. That is to say that our lives are more and more
oriented around responding to dimensions of reality that do not form part of Nature, at
least insofar as Nature corresponds to the world of our situated senses and ordinary
perceptions. Consider, for instance, the gap between climate and weather. Weather, as
everyone knows, is a local and temporally situated phenomenon, the state of sun, rain,
heat or cold at a particular moment and place. Climate is something different ; it is
something tacked together out of statistical averages and rendered apparent to us only
via extraordinarily complex mathematical models. We can see weather, and we perhaps
have an intuitive grasp of climate, in the sense that we are approximately aware of the
changes in the seasons and the normal variability of weather in any particular location.
Yet global climate is not something that we can see, and we indeed have a very difficult
time  placing  ourselves,  and  placing  where  we  find  ourselves  within  global  climate
change.  It  is  too  weird,  too  dissonant  with  our  perceptions,  not  to  feel  lost  when
acknowledging that the incredible volume of snow that fell on the East Coast of the
United States during the winter of 2013-14 was a function of global warming. Climate
change, to be precise, is a black box phenomenon in that our access to it is mediated
through complicated computer models,  like so much of science, according to Bruno
Latour. Perhaps some scientists understand the models, though for most of us we only
understand the predictions. Yet as terrifying as these predictions are, more terrifying
still (or perhaps calming for the climate deniers) is the fact that these models of climate
themselves are, as NASA climatologist Gavin Schmidt has noted, “not right or wrong ;
they’re  always  wrong,”  they  are  always  “approximations,”  always  “reductions”
(Schmidt 2014).
35 The Age of Asymmetry comes after the end of the world. That is to say that we who live
in the Anthropocene no longer find ourselves capable of believing in the innocence of
the  sensual  world  that  surrounds  us.  Our  world  has  become  weird,  our  reality
horrifying. We are too aware that the apparent nothing that comes out of our cars
when we start them is accumulating in infinitely minute particles in the atmosphere.
Unlike  the  soot  and smog that  threatened our  major  cities  as  far  back  as  the  19th
century,  prompting  cries  of  alarm  from  William  Blake  and  other  Romantic  Poets,
carbon dioxide is invisible. We cannot see the upwards of 400 ppm of carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gasses that currently exist in our atmosphere. Nor can we situate
this pollution, for the global climate is just as threatened by those invisible particles in
the most pristine regions of the Canadian North as it is in the visibly smoggy streets of
Shanghai. Yet even where air pollution is concerned, weirder, deeper realities intrude
into our awareness. According to scientists, it is not the larger, visible pollutants that
are the most carcinogenic, but rather the infinitesimally small nanoparticles. Thus our
cities may seem to be visibly less polluted than in the past, but they may actually be
just as dangerous to our health while simultaneously seeming cleaner. A similar world-
shattering tension between apparent health and purity versus death-dealing reality is
present in many ordinary household objects. Consider the case of BPA, a form of plastic
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widely used in the 20th century for the fabrication of items such as baby bottle nipples.
Originally considered ideal for this application because of its translucency (a signal of
purity  according  to  our  senses),  this  material  was  later  discovered  to  be  a  potent
endocrine disruptor (Cicolella 1963). Today, tests show that 93 % of the population have
traces  of  BPA  in  their  systems,  and  because  of  this  our  societies  are  seeing  an
augmentation of the number cases of breast and prostate cancer,  a decline of male
sperm  quality,  early  pubescence  in  girls,  metabolic  disorders  such  as  diabetes  and
obesity, and behavioral disorders such as hyperactivity and ADHD. 
36 Living in the Anthropocene implies that we are no longer at home, or that our home is
no longer comfortable but filled with terrors and depths that are perhaps best captured
by the metaphysics of the weird that we have uncovered in our explorations of weird
fiction. Living in the Anthropocene implies not only that we are aware that the world
has dimensions that exceed the grasp of our senses, but also that there are dimensions
or depths to the real that exist beyond even those of science. Despite all of the efforts
taken by weird writers to resist  reducing the real,  despite all  of  their  wars against
language and geometric space, weird writing is always in the end naturalized, and that
is  to  say  retuned  to  the  world  of  reason,  order,  and  anthropomorphically  ordered
representations, if only in the inverted sense of presenting us with the supernatural.
Doubtless  the  supernatural  is  no  more  the  real  than the  Natural,  and  perhaps  the
problem with horror is that it may tend to produce a kind of paralysis and existential
nihilism within its readers, in the way that a blood-curdling scream can freeze us in our
tracks.  But  given  our  society’s  tendency  to  lapse  into  close-minded  ignorance,
particularly towards ecological  problems,  I  am hardly sure that this  is  a  bad thing,
though the question of ecological nihilism, which is not identical with our society’s
present but disavowed desire for ecocide, merits further discussion.
37 The horror of the Anthropocene and the real of weird realism remind us of the inutility
of trying to naively suture together the real and the Natural, even if this is clearly the
ambition  of  most  place-based  writing  and  critical  studies  thereof.  The  weird
expressionism of horror, in its striving to express the unnamable while leaving it dark,
at  least  leads  us  towards  a  real  appreciation  of  the  difficulty  of  thinking  and
representing  places,  and  indeed  towards  an  appreciation  of  the  way  in  which
overlooking this difficulty fuels the destructive tendencies in our civilization. If ecology
is the study of organisms and their relations to their environments—relations between
objects  and  the  other  objects  composing  places  around  them—then  being  a  realist
ecologist  is  being  sensitized  to  that  which  not  only  is  visible  but  which  is  also
withdrawn  or  wholly  other ;  that  which  is  reality  but  also  ungraspable  within  all
naturalist accounts of the ambient world. While one might question the utility of this
realism, noting that we only blindly touch upon the real and only then via the help of
fiction and the imagination, reading weird realist writings and criticism teaches us to
look  for  the  overlooked  (and  not  just  to  look  at  the  overlooked).  Re-encountering
familiar scenes after having read horror is to see these scenes with heightened senses,
with an awareness of straining for sight beyond sight. Thus the weird hardly leads us
away from the places in which we dwell. On the contrary, it brings us back to them with
x-ray attentiveness and extraordinary humility. 
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NOTES
1. In a recent article VanderMeer has described his work as “weird nature writing,” a generic
description that I am tweaking here.
2. On the Anthropocene, both as a notion as a phenomenon, see Bonneuil and Fressoz’s excellent
L'événement  anthropocène :  La  Terre,  l'histoire  et  nous,  as  well  as  Timothy Morton’s  Hyperobjects :
Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World
3. Heidegger talks about these two notions in several places, though perhaps most prominently
in his pivotal essay, “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken”.
4. Lovecraft once insisted that the “crux of a weird tale is something which could not possibly
happen.  If  any  unexpected  advance  of  physics,  chemistry,  or  biology  were  to  indicate  the
possibility of any phenomena related by the weird tale, that particular set of phenomena would
cease to be weird in the ultimate sense because it would become surrounded by a different set of
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emotions” (Lovecraft 1973, 8). His point here is not that physics, chemistry, and biology cannot
be used within the weird tale, but rather that the ultimate reality explored by the weird tale lies
beyond this beyond.
5. Heidegger  first  introduces  and most  extensively  theorizes  this  point  in  an  essay  to  Ernst
Jünger  dedicated  to  the  theme of  nihilism.  Here  he  writes  that  the  this  “crossways  striking
through” of the word is meant to suggest the “almost unbreakable habit” of seeing “Being” as a
“thing standing standing by itself then approaching humankind,” a bit later he will clarify this by
suggesting that this correlates with an alienated relationship to being, one appropriate to the
tension between humanity and Being—nihilism—that correlates with Being as it is “conceived of
through the subject-object relation” (Heidegger 2008, 179). A precision relative to my own usage
of the word in what follows is necessary. While Heidegger’s primary interest is in forcing us to
recognize representation’s role in distancing us from a Being that would be ours, our usage of the
term cuts in the opposite direction, signaling the tendency to think of Being as representation
(“Being”) as a being that also and likewise obscures the independent and autonomous Being of
objects.  This  Being  is  likewise  ignored  by  the  metaphysics  of  presence,  if  it  is  also,  and
systematically,  ignored  by  Heidegger  (if  it  has  been  recuperated  for  philosophy  by  Graham
Harman’s (2005) work on Heidegger).
ABSTRACTS
This article deals with the generally underestimated importance of horror fiction for eco-critical
thinking about place. It looks at three major horror writers, Poe, Lovecraft, and VanderMeer,
exploring the ways that each plays with and deepens our understanding of what it means to be in
a place.  Contrary to  popular  opinion,  which would claim that  horror  writers  both use stock
backgrounds, and in any case deal only with fictions, I argue that horror fiction is in many ways
more realist than other forms of writing, and as such deserving of far more critical attention
than it has thus far been accorded by eco-critics.
Cet article traite de l’importance généralement minorée du roman d’horreur dans la réflexion
sur la notion de lieu au sein de la pensée écocritique. Il observe la façon dont trois écrivains
importants  du  roman  d’horreur :  Poe,  Lovecraft,  et  VanderMeer,  jouent  avec  notre
compréhension de la notion du lieu tout en l’approfondissant. Contrairement à la plupart des
éco-critiques,  qui  ne  voient  dans  le  roman d’horreur  que des  rapports  très  superficiels  avec
l’environnement, ou plutôt une tendance à la fiction pure, je soutiens que le roman d’horreur est,
d’une certaine manière, beaucoup plus réaliste que d’autres formes de récits et, que partant, il
mérite plus d’attention que ne lui en ont accordé les éco-critiques jusqu’à présent.
INDEX
Mots-clés: horreur, écologie, lieu, ontologie centrée sur l’objet
Keywords: horror, ecology, place, Object-Oriented Ontology
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